CVE-2026-31555: futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path

Severity: medium (CVSS 5.5 v3.1)
Exploited in the wild: not listed in CISA KEV
EPSS: 0.1% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
Public exploit or detection template: none known
Published: 2026-04-24 · updated 2026-10-15

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered: WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524 When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'. After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting(). CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 futex_lock_pi(uaddr) // acquires the PI futex exit() futex_cleanup_begin() futex_state = EXITING; futex_lock_pi(uaddr) futex_lock_pi_atomic() attach_to_pi_owner() // observes EXITING *exiting = owner; // takes ref return -EBUSY wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner) put_task_struct(); // drops ref // exiting still points to owner goto retry; futex_lock_pi_atomic() lock_pi_update_atomic() cmpxchg(uaddr) *uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever // value changed return -EAGAIN; wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting) Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi.

Affected products

Linux kernel: from 4.4.255 before 4.5; from 4.9.255 before 4.10; from 4.14.158 before 4.15; from 4.19.172 before 4.20; from 5.4.1 before 5.5; from 5.5.1 before 5.10.253 — fixed in 4.10, 4.15, 4.20, 4.5, 5.10.253, 5.15.203

How to fix

Upgrade to a fixed version: Linux kernel 4.10, 4.15, 4.20, 4.5. Check the vendor advisory for mitigations.

References

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