CVE-2026-64114: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5

Severity: high (CVSS 7.8 v3.1)
Exploited in the wild: not listed in CISA KEV
EPSS: 0.1% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
Public exploit or detection template: none known
Published: 2026-07-19 · updated 2026-10-19
Weakness: CWE-125

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5 raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length: iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL; if (iphlen > length) goto error_free; if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) { /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */ } It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic. An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path. Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to. Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it. Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain the self-reported iph->ihl. Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the trigger uses a real netdev. Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock distro kernel.

Affected products

Linux kernel: from 2.6.12.1 before 5.10.258; from 5.11 before 5.15.209; from 5.16 before 6.1.175; from 6.2 before 6.6.142; from 6.7 before 6.12.92; from 6.13 before 6.18.34 — fixed in 5.10.258, 5.15.209, 6.1.175, 6.12.92, 6.18.34, 6.6.142

How to fix

Upgrade to a fixed version: Linux kernel 5.10.258, 5.15.209, 6.1.175, 6.12.92. Check the vendor advisory for mitigations.

References

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